MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATION
When mathematics is taught using lots of applications and the applicability of mathematics is emphasized <pe r haps to the point of becoming the guide and justification of mathematics education), students are likely to come to believe that the mathematics is win-the worldly circumstances which are the focus of the application at hand. Such a belief does not encourage the investigation of the limitations of the application of mathematics to the situation. Further, it is ground for coming to see worldly reality as a mathematical edifice which must be conquered, and oneself as feeble before it. It would be better to teach that mathematics is the study of an independent, extant reality; and that any application of mathematics is the postUlating of an analogy between a set of worldly circumstances and a set of mathematical circumstances. Then the coincidence of pattern is a cause for delight, and the limitations are expected, even if they are not seen.
I wish here to argue that we mathematics teachers should not feel that it is necessary to justify whatever mathematics we teach by its applicability, and further that even the most applicable mathematics should be presented as being worthy of study independent of its applicability, not least because its application will be done best when its independence is accepted. By 'application' I mean not only the use of mathematical patterns to increase control or predictive power in practical situations, but also the use of mathematical patterns to increase understanding in practical or impractical or even fantastical situations.
When I was learning to fly, my instructors told me, MThe throttle controls your altitude, the elevator controls your speed, not the other way around. M I now believe that is a distortion, but it was a very useful one. When one begins flying an airplane, he has a natural tendency to believe that the throttle controls the airplane's speed and the elevator makes the plane go up or down. In fact, the situation is much more complicated than that: and my instructors' dictum was instrumental in my learning to use the two controls effectively. I would use it today if I were to take the controls of an airplane again.
I don't think the phenomenon of an idea being of good effect even if it is a distortion is a partiCUlarly unusual one. Another example might be the dictum, MThere is no important difference between men and women. M Or, ·When acting in a play by Shakespeare, one should never give emphasis to a personal pronoun.~If those sentences are not true, acting as if they were might nevertheless have good effects because they counteract some deeply ingrained erroneous biases.
The idea I want to offer here is, I suspect, correct . Even if it is not, however, acting as if it were would have good effects. And so I want to present the idea here, examine some of its consequences, and defend that complex consisting of the idea and its consequences.
The idea is this: first, that mathematics is an account of an extant reality that is independent of physical reality or social reality; and second, that it is therefore appropriate to understand applications of mathematics in various arenas as analogies, analogies which often appear as metaphors.
I don't know, nor do I care, just what philosophical position I am taking when I say that mathematics is an account of an extant reality. The important point is that mathematical truth is independent of human judgment. 29 is prime. 27 is not prime. Those sentences are true not because I or any expert says 50, but because 29 La prime and 27 is~prime. That is just the way they are. I don't know offhand whether forty-three times sixty-seven is equal to fifty-one times sixty-one, but there is no doubt that it either is or it isn't, independent of anything anyone does or says. Mathematical truth is about the least contingent truth around. Mathematical reality is there to be discovered or observed.
At the same time, mathematics gives an account of logical inevitability, not physical inevitability.~There is one thing ••• of which a geometry is~a picture, and •.
• that is the so-called real world,· says the famous mathematician, G. H. Hardy. (1) No one can mathematically prove that the sun will rise tomorrow or that it won't, that the stone will fall when released, that closing the circuit will cause the light bulb to come on, or whatever: physical reality may more or less coincide with mathematical pattern, but it is not constrained by it. This fact gives substance to the word 'unreasonable' in the title of Eugene Wigner 1s essay, ·The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.
What, then, is the relationship between mathematics and, say, physics? Is mathematics a language in which physics is expressed, as is suggested by the title of Tobias Dantzig's book, Number; The Language of Science ? () If I am right that mathematics is an account of an extant reality, then it is certainly more than a language. Perhaps mathematical symbolism is a language, but the mathematical ideas, the mathematical facts, expressed by the symbols are not mere language. Rather, physics is a science which, among o t he r things, makes analogies between mathematical circumstances and physical circumstances . If extent of spatial separation is like number, and this particular spatial separation has an extent which we take to be like the number 5, then that one has an extent which is like the number 7, and furthermore, the two of them together constitute a spatial separation the extent of which is like the number 12. This is not a particularly unusual idea; mathematicians and scientists often refer to mathematical Mmodels· of worldly circumstances, by which they don't mean anything too different from what I mean when I use the word 'analogy.' Why, then, do I choose to use that somewhat unusual word? Because the word 'analogyl tends to remind us of certain things that the word 'model' does not. The important points are these: any analogy has two parts or sides, and the extent of validity of an analogy is always in question. (Note Wendell Berry's words, quoted later in this pa pe r , I
There are, roughly speaking, two kinds of analogy: explicit and implicit, simile and metaphor. The literary critic Northrop Frye obse rves,
In descriptive writing you have to be careful of associative language. You'll find that [simile], or likeness to something else, is very tricky to handle in description, because the differences are as important as the resemblances. As for metaphor, where you're really saying Mthis~that,M you're turning your back on logic and reason completely, because logically two things can never be the same thing and still remain two things •••• The motive for metaphor, according to Wallace Stevens, is a desire to associate, and finally to identify, the human mind with what goes on outside it, because the only genUine joy you can have is in those rare moments when you feel that although we may know in part, as Paul says, we are also a part of what we know. (4) If application of mathematics is the making of analogies, then in much of human knOWledge, mathematics is (ironically, for if mathematics is not logical, then nothing is) not a simile but a metaphor, in fact an unconcious metaphor, a culturally subconcious metaphor, for other sorts of reality.
Digression
The words left out by the ellipsis in the quote by Northrop Frye are, The poet, however, uses these two crude, primitive, archaic forms of thought in the most unhibited way, because his job is not to describe nature, but to show you a world completely absorbed and possessed by the human minde So he produces what Baudelaire called ã suggestive magic including at the same time object and sUbject, the world outside the artist and the artist himself." (5) And when Frye mentions Wallace Stevens, he is referring to the following poem by Stevens:
The Motive for Metaphor You like it under the trees in autumn, Because everything is half dead. The wind moves like a cripple among the leaves And repeats words without meaning.
In the same way, you were happy in spring, With the half colors of quarter-things, The slightly brighter sky, the melting clouds, The single bird, the obscure moon--The obscure moon lighting an obscure world Of things that Would never be quite expressed, Where you yourself were never quite yourself And did not want nor have to be, Desiring the exhilarations of changes: The motive for metaphor, shrinking from The weight of primary noon, The ABC of being, The rUddy temper, the hammer Of red and blue, the hard sound--Steel against intimation--the sharp flash, The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant x.
Frye's contrast between~describing nature~and~showing a world possessed by the human mind,~and Stevens's use of technical symbols (A B C, X, weight, primary noon, temper, steel) for what is shrunk from when one is motivated to metaphor, suggest that I am off base, that the whole point of what they are talking about is the contrast between poetry on the one hand and the ·objective-worlds described by math and science on the othere But remember that Stevens's title is -The Motive for Metaphor.Ĩ s not science an (in some ways quite successful) attempt by the human mind to absorb and possess a world?
It is one of the ironies of Man's present condition that a motive of identification should have been a driVing force behind what seems to so many to be the SOurce of so much alienation, i.e., the application of mathematics to worldly circumstances. As I put the fin i shing t ouches on this essay, I am starting t o read a new boo k by the philosopher William Barrett, in whi ch I f ound this: W e note th e e xt r a or d i na r y power and constructivity of the human mind in producing the great edifice of modern science. And y e t , precisely here occurs one of the supreme ironies of modern history: The structure that mo s t emphatically ex hibits the power of mind nev e r t hel e s s leads t o the denigration of the human mind. The success of the physical science s leads t o t he at ti tu de of scienti fic ma te r i a l i sm, according t o which the mind becomes, i n one way or an other, me r ely t he pas s i ve pl ayt hing of ma t e r i a l f orces. The of f s pr i ng turns aga inst its parent . We f orget what we s hould hav e learned from Kant : that the i mprint of mind i s ev e r ywhe r e on the body of this science, and without the founding power of mind it would not exist.
The irony here is not one that we can merely sit back and enjoy aesthetically. This doubt of the mind, in its -actual consequences, in the lives of individuals and societies, provides one of th e ordeals that modern c i vilization wi l l have t o go through. (6) Return Frye suggests earl ier in his essay that as science moves from data towards l aw s, i t M moves toward i magination,M it tends to invo ke ma t hema t i c s , which, along with lit erature and music, is ( he say s ) a language of the i magination. MA highly de vel oped science and a highly developed art are very close together, psychologically and otherwise. M (7) Pursuit of mathematics is the pur sui t of understanding. (He nr y Pollack has said that the essence of science is the right to repeat an experiment, while t he essence of mathematics is the right to under stand.(8» Surely understanding is, in Fr ye's terms, the identification of the human mind with something outside it, the attribution of meaning to the coincidence of pattern. In the case of a pplications of mathematics, meaning is often attributed to the co i nc ide nce of mathematical patterns with patterns of worldly c i r c ums t ance s. Carried along by th e logical inev itability of ma t hema t i cs , undaunted by Obs cur i t i e s in the coincidence of the patterns, users of mathematical applications can come to believe that the mathematics is "in" the worldly circumstances. The aesthetic properties of ceremony, for mula, natural pr ocesses are intimations of comple x and profound intellectual objects, but the difficulties of intellectual cl a r i f i c a t i on and discriminati on leave t he mind in va r ious attitudes of belief. For every intelle ctual object, half-comprehended, there is an aesth etic obj ect before which we bow in more or less deep reverence. Pure aesthetic contemplation and complete intellectual clarity are seldom found in human beings, and any middle ground is touched with credulity a nd idolatry. (11) As to the metaphysical nostalgia,
[a stage of ma t hema t i ca l discovery] results when we can see the rel ati ons holdi ng between Qualities •••• Mathematical functions find elementary values in qualities .
Qualities find their relations in the functi on s of ma th ema t i cs . Whenever this happens, a system is recogniz ed, and it takes on a quasiindependence and reality. Often the effect on the thinker is a conv iction. Belief attaches itself only to such sys tems . The further e xpa n si on s and the wider assumptions are ignored and there is a resting point for thought in a mathematico-poetic allegory. (12) Of co urse, we are dealing here not with a disorder or aberration in human thought processes, but with the very nature of thought itself . Buchanan's account has some similarities with this desc r i pt ion by Ernst Cassir er:
[For the religious genius,] the power of his belief first prove s itself in being made pUblic. He must communicate his belief to others, he must fill them with his own religious passion and fervor, in order to be certain of his belief. This is possible only by mean s of religious constructs--constructs which begin as sy mbols and end as dogmas. Thus, even here, ev ery initial expr e s s i on of feeling is already the beginning of an alienation. It is the destiny and , in a sense, t he i mmanent tragedy of every s pi r i t ua l for m that it can ne ver overcome this inner tension ; to extinguish it is to extinguish the life of the spir it. For the life And, in Cassirer1 s view, this pattern runs deep. Lat er, but t al ki ng about the same e xampl e , he says, J oseph Weizenbaum, a computer scientist and teacher of computer science, speaks this message t o h is fell ow computer science teachers: the same forms of c ultur e ceaseless and ( 14)
Return And s o it is that here, too, we find os ci l l a t i on which sets in within all a s they begin to take shape [,] ••• the irresistible rhythm of life itself.
I .
•. affirm that the computer i s a powerful new metaphor f or helping us to understand ma ny aspects of the world, but that it enslaves the mind that has no other met aphors and few other r e sources to callan. The wo r l d i s many things, an d no s ingle framework is large e nough to contain them all, neither that of man's science nor that of his poetry, ne ither that of calculating reason nor t hat of pur e intuition. And just as love of music does not suffice to enable one to play the violin--one must al so master the craft of the instrument and of music itself--so is it not enough to love humanity in order t o help it survive. The t eacher's calling to t each h is craft is therefore an honorabl e one . But he must do mo r e than that : he mus t teach mor e t han one me t a pho r , a nd he mus t teach more by the example of his conduct t ha n by what he write s on t he blackboard. He mus t te ach t he limitations of his tools as well a s their pow er. ( 1 6) of the spirit consists is this very act of severing what is whole in order that what has been severed may be even more securely united. (13) and that knowled ge is passed from one human being to another, of t e n as subject matter in academic courses .
And s o we can see how math emati cal c i r c ums t a nce s , which are intrinsi call y l ogical, be come illogically (but perhaps mo re or less appr opriately) i dentified with t hings they are not, namely worldly . circumst ances. Mathematics is{ like the computer, a powerful metaphor. Unlike the computer, 1t is not a new metaphor. Any metaphor can take on excessive significance in a human imagination. Perhaps because mathematics is not a new metaphor, we are inured to it a bit; but that may just mean that we have lost the nervous uncertainty that comes with venturing into new territory, but not seen enough failure of the metaphor to undermine our credulity. Metaphor is a wonderful thing, not at all to be scorned. Even if it were not wonderful, it would probably be inevitable. (17) The motive for metaphor is a glorious aspect of human nature. G. Spencer-Brown observes,~That mathematics, in common with other art forms, can lead us beyond ordinary existence, and can show us something of the structure in which all creation hangs together, is no new idea.· (18) But we need not take away from the value of the metaphor, or from the metaphorical experience, indeed we will enhance them, if we keep in mind the question, ·What are the limits of this metaphor?· If the application of mathematics is the construction of analogy, whether simile or metaphor; and if we are to effectively understand the limits of the analogy; then we must have some understanding of each of the two things being compared, and that understanding must be wider than what is immediately relevant to the analogy. Hearing Macbeth say of Duncan, After life1s fitful fever he sleeps well, (19) we bring to bear all our experience of life, fever, sleep, and death; and if we did not know enough of sleep and death, of life and fever, to know many ways in which they are not alike, as well as ways in which they are, then the metaphors would not be as rich and effective, the sentence not as beautiful, as they are. Of course, at the same time, analogies broaden our experience, deepen our understanding, give us new insights into the things being compared; indeed, that is their very function.
What does all this mean for the teaching and learning of mathematics? It means we should teach and learn mathematics beyond that which is ·relevant,~that which appears explicitly in applications of practical importance. The perennial students' question, ·When will we ever use this?-is a misguided question, one to which we should not succumb. That is not to say that we should refuse to answer it; but we should deny that the question is determinative of what is important in a person's stUdy of mathematics. Mathematics is one side of a myriad of important analogies; if we are to understand that side, then we must understand, we must teach and learn, mathematics itself. (And, of course, the study of mathematics itself has its own rewards, quite apart from applicability. Alfred North Whitehead describes the pursuit of mathematics as "a divine madness of the human spirit, a refuge from the goading urgency of contingent happenings.· (20) Hardy says, "Real mathematics ••• must be justified as art i f it can be justified at all.
M (21) Scott
Buchanan obs e rve s , -The s tructures with which mathematics de als are more like l ace, the l eaves of trees, and the pl ay of light and s hadow o n a meadow or a human face, than th ey are like buildings and machines, the least of their representati ves.· ( 22» Knowled ge of calculus has vocational value for engi neer s and others, but its value is increased by deep understanding of the mathemati c al theory of calculus; knowledge of statistics is per ha ps ne cessary for informed citizenship; knowledge of arithmetic ha s s urvival v al ue : knowledge of number t he o ry may hav e none of these, but it str engthens one's understandi ng of ma t hema ti c s as an i nd ependen t reality which is in some of it s facets anal ogous t o some face ts of o the r kinds of reality. ( 23) I t a l so mean s t hat we s houl d resist, and t each our students to r esist, an y t endency t o neglect t hose aspects of other s o r ts of reality tha t do not fit into those analogies with ma t hemat i c a l reality that we call applications. We should in fact look f or them. We should seek to understand the limitations of our analogi es, and we will understand them better if we know what i s beyond them, on both sides. We will be the richer for knowing what of mathematical reality does not fit the physical circumstances, and what of physical reality does not fit the ma t hema ti ca l c ircumstances, of whatever mathematical application we are deal ing with . W e should, in short, let mathematics be, just as other disciplines are, the pursuit of ways of seeing, the pursuit of v i s i ons . We should teach our students to look for mathematical analogies, to delight in them when they f ind them, to stretch them and test them and savor them, but not to be consumed by them lest they, we, suffer the fate of all tragic heroes. (24) We will lay the proper foundation if we teach them mathematics itself, as inde pendent, extant reality, whose wapplications ( 23) Buchanan makes several comments relevant to mathematical pe da go gy . Here is one that relates to the use of ma t hema t i ca l applications in the classroom:
Mathematics is not a compendium of memorizable formula and magically manipulated figures. Sometimes it uses formulae and manipulates figures, but it does this because it is concerned with ideas already familiar to the ordinary mind, but needing special sets of words or s ymbols for the sake of precise expres sion and efficient communication. Further, the abstraction thus signalized, which most people from bad emo t i o n al habits fear, is actually much mo r e familiar to the untrained mi n d than any observed facts could possibly be. Abstract ideas are of the v e ry tissue of the human mi nd . For this reason a nd f or ma ny others, illustration of ma t hema t i c s by concrete event, fact, or obj ect i s never as effective as illustration by equally abstract analogous ideas.
Ibid, pp. 35-6 . Of course, in this passage Buchanan is speaking of the use of the concrete to illustrate mathematics, rather than the use of mathemati cs to explain the concrete. 
